In this paper we argue that the disappearance of jobs that served as the backbone of a politically moderate working class fragmented parties on the left. First, we build a simple model of strategic platform competition to show that a decrease in the cohesiveness of the left vote fragments the parties on the left and shifts the enacted policy away from the median voter.
Introduction
Democratic politics the world over are convulsing from the disappearance of jobs that secured the livelihood of a politically moderate working class. Figure 1 shows that industrial jobs in OECD countries have declined dramatically, decreasing in Germany, for example, from 33 percent of total employment to 10 percent. Shrinking trade unions have attenuated the political power of organized labor, and rising structural unemployment in many countries has opened up fissures among traditional allies on the political left.
Our goal in this paper is to understand how post-industrial labor market fragmentation may be reconfiguring electoral politics in the democratic world. We view these demographic shifts against the background of the particularly successful postwar political economy of Europe in which Although various configurations of parties in government favored more or less growth at the expense of more or less wage equality, decades-long industrial competitiveness was the political left's ticket to the bargaining table (Iversen and Wren 1998) . These arrangements also led to cartelization of the economy which ran the risk of externalizing the costs of high and stable wages onto consumers and taxpayers. But because the wage earners were themselves so large a percentage of the population, they largely internalized these costs in the form of wage restraint (Calmfors and Driffill 1985) .
Labor unions formed the core of a formidable and consistent voting bloc for the political left because of significant unionization rates. While some scholarly attention is directed to bargaining among market players, it was left-leaning parties in coalition governments with access to levers Proportional representation electoral rules can be understood to have supported left-leaning parties' accountability to unionized workers. The contrast is with plurality electoral systems, under which parties are forced to aim at broader coalitions than industrial workers alone. The governments and policies produced by these systems would, in principle, be similar to the extent that industrial workers encompass the median voter. Fragmentation of worker interests and their organizations could produce a corresponding fragmentation of their political loyalties. This paper finds both theoretically and empirically that the decline in industrial employment is multiplying parties on the left at the expense of party size.
We first construct a simple formal model to characterize the incentives of parties competing for voters with party platforms in a proportional system. 1 We restrict our discussion to programmatic, rather than clientelist, platforms. 2 Four parties compete by proposing binding policy platforms in a one-dimensional space, and we study how these platforms change as the cohesiveness of the left vote decreases, made precise in the next section. The formal model forces us to generate internally consistent implications about equilibrium party platforms, and the mechanisms by which they produce equilibrium fragmentation and policy outcomes, on the basis of which we generate empirically testable propositions.
The basic story that the model illuminates is well illustrated in the Germany case of Figure   1 (b). When the industrial jobs first start disappearing, the traditional left party (in this case, the SPD) sticks to organized workers, leaving disaffected workers in the center to be taken by a nontraditional party (in this case, the Green party). This first stage in Germany) fragments the left by decreasing the vote share of the SPD and by giving rise to the Greens. 3 When industrial jobs fall below a threshold, the traditional party finds it optimal to take the center, leaving the organized labor up for grabs for a non-traditional party (in this case, the Left or Die Linke). This second stage starts with a sharp decrease in industrial jobs at the start of the nineties, followed by a move to the center from Schroder's SPD with the 2002's Hartz reforms 4 (grey vertical line in Figure 1 (b)), and the rise of the Left party, nearly doubling the seats in parliament of this faction (30-32 to 54). These trends are not unique to Germany, and in this paper we provide systematic evidence across OECD democracies revealing that the decline in industrial employment fragments parties on the left. In particular, we show that a 10 percent fall in industrial jobs is associated with 1 The formal literature on multi-party platform competition in non-majoritarian systems is scarce. See Buisseret (2017) for a notable exception.
2 In the sense of Stokes et al. (2013) 3 A confounding factor giving rise to the greens in this era is the rise of environmentalism. Here we use Germany simply as a stylized example; our main results come from a panel comparison that takes into account seasonal trends such as environmentalism.
an increase of 0.6 (effective) parties on the left, although only in non-SMD systems, with higher intensity the more proportional the electoral system, and mostly in parliamentary democracies.
The larger question at stake is how political fragmentation on the left may reshape coalition governments policies. In the optimistic view, party fragmentation should have minimal effects.
Parties in coalition, no matter their number and dispersion of preferences, should be able to bargain away externalities of their respective policy differences (Powell; Kalandrakis and Powell; Martin and Vanberg; Hallerberg, Strauch, and von Hagen). To the extent this is true, coalition governments with many small parties should be as capable of aiming at economy-strengthening policies as The model informs us that, to the extent that campaign proposals can be enforced, fragmentation on the left shifts the equilibrium policy away from the median voter, by way of the electoral competition brought about by the fall in industrial jobs. Using the timing of scheduled elections to exploit changes in party fragmentation at arbitrary dates and identify difference-in-difference estimates, we provide suggestive evidence of this phenomenon. We find that spending on social protection and environmental protection, bastions of the left, increases with left fragmentation when the left is government and decreases when the right is, signs of policy changes to benefit one or the other pole. Additionally, spending on public goods such as community services, defense and government researchers decreases with left fragmentation. Policy outcomes are more difficult to measure because some of them take longer to manifest. Here we find that, when the left is in government, one additional left party causes an increase of 1 percent in the share of workers who are unemployed, an effect similar across women, youth, and long-term unemployed, perhaps a consequence of organized labor's forcing hand on employment benefits and protections at the expense of displaced workers who find it hard to get a new job due to high employment costs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple formal model of platform competition that guides our intuition. Section 3 discusses the data, research design and empirical results. Section 4 concludes.
Model
For fragmentation to occur, some parties must loose vote share to others, and it is not a-priori clear that strategic party leaders will allow this to happen as vote cohesiveness decreases. In this section we present a simple model of programatic platform competition to study this formally. 2 who choose to vote for a party. Hoteling-Downs models which include more than two parties have the inconvenience that they have either no or multiple equilibria.
In order to generate useful implications, we make two simplifications. First, Left and Right parties differ in the policies available to them, where Left parties (NTL and TL) can only propose policies up to the center ( 1 2 ) and Right parties (NTR and TR) only above it. Second, within left and right, traditional and non-traditional parties differ in two aspects: (i) voters hold a bias towards traditional parties, b L and b R , and (ii) traditional parties choose platforms first. 5 To focus on the left, in this paper we will further assume that the non-traditional right party is a far-right party, which we capture by restricting its platform set to [ 3 4 , 1]. 6 The preferences for a voter of ideal point i can be represented by |i − p| if voting for a nontraditional party with platform p and |i − p| + b j if voting for traditional party j ∈ L, R with platform p. Notice this assumes that voters vote sincerely −for their most preferred choice− rather than strategically −for the resulting policy. As baseline, we assume parties wish to maximize their vote share −that is, we assume a perfectly proportional type of electoral system−, and have no policy preference. We assume this baseline electoral system because, as it will become evident in the results section, in a winner-take-all system changes in the cohesiveness of voters does not affect fragmentation, if anything only the number of districts going to the left or the right.
In order to capture changes in the cohesiveness of voters, assume that initially all voters leftof-center vote together, as if their ideal point was its mean, 1 4 , and all those right-of-center do the same, in . 7 As the left looses cohesiveness, we will assume that the center-most left voters separate 5 Sequential platform proposal simplifies the exposition because, if they were simultaneous, only mixed strategy equilibria would exist. 6 These simplifications do not change the results regarding left party fragmentation, only the vote share of each left party and both combined, and the corresponding policy implemented by parliament. We will leave the full development of the model for a different, theory-oriented paper. 7 We can either assume they all share the same ideal point, , or we can assume that ideal points are uniformly while the left-most voters remain in the unified group. Define m the center-most left voter who is part of the unified group or, equivalently, the size of the left base, initially 1 2 . m summarizes the degree of cohesiveness. Figure 2 illustrates this. Finally, the parliament's policy choice is the weighted average of the platform proposals of each party elected to parliament, weighted by their seat (vote) share, as if a minority or a grand coalition governed. We will also compare this policy choice with that resulting from having only one side of the aisle choosing the policy.
Given the sequential nature of the platform proposals, the equilibrium concept we will use is sub-game perfect equilibrium. We will study equilibrium party platforms, party fragmentation and the parliament's policy choice as m decreases.
Notice that this is not a good model to explain the rise in far-right vote share of the past years.
The current model is set up to allow us to isolate the left phenomenon. In fact, depending on the equilibrium platforms of left parties, it is not clear whether the loss of cohesiveness in the left vote will generate more or less incentives for right parties to take the center. Thus, a necessary extension to capture the far-right phenomenon would be to change the cohesiveness of the right vote as well, perhaps splitting the unified group in two, and study (a) whether in equilibrium the traditional right would prefer to moderate and (b) at what point they loose the far-right vote. We leave this for future research.
Equilibrium Analysis
First, for any m, the equilibrium involves the traditional right party proposing , the equilibrium strategies T L and N T L for the traditional and nondistributed in the unit interval but some external mechanism, e.g. union's power, makes them all vote together. 8 In the appendix we discuss the equilibrium for a general bias, where while strategies are more convoluted conclusions remain almost identical.
traditional parties respectively are
Proof. All proofs are in the appendix.
As m decreases from the median, first the non-traditional takes the center and the traditional left extremes its proposal to cater to the unified group. This continues until the unified group ceases to be attractive for the traditional party, m = . This partly mimics the fact that the green party (moderate left party) appeared first in the German political scene followed only later by the rise of the far-left party, similar to other European experiences.
As soon as the traditional left moderates, the non-traditional left takes the unified group. This is an equilibrium until the unified group is small enough so that its cohesiveness ceases to matter.
At this point, that is for all m < 1 4 − b, the unique equilibrium involves both parties playing a "median voter" type of game on the space of left voters, with the traditional right threatening to take center votes from the right. Absent a bias, the unique equilibrium would be the proposals of . strategy changes this trajectory, but only for a small range of m, after which fragmentation remains constant, always higher than that of the initial, unified situation. Finally, notice that in a winnertake-all system no fragmentation would occur, either the traditional right or the traditional left would win each district depending on the district's voter distribution (see Cox (1997) ). Therefore, we should expect fragmentation only in multi-member districts, and our conjectured policy effects should be clearer among countries with these systems. An illustration of the left parties' vote share and resulting party fragmentation in Figure 4 .
3 Empirical Evidence Figure 1 shows that fragmentation has on average increased as industrial jobs have halved. In this section we provide systematic evidence that indeed a decrease in the share of industrial jobs is associated with an increase in left party fragmentation, a relation that is at least partly causal. At the end, we provide suggestive evidence that left fragmentation has resulted in a policy shift away from the median, as predicted by the model.
We first describe the data, then the research designs and corresponding threats to identification, to finally present the results.
Data
We collect data on electoral rules, electoral results of legislative elections, and economic performance of the 35 OECD countries for 1945 to 2017. 9 For every election held democratically in this sample, we record the rules regarding: parliamentary or presidential system, district system (majoritarian, proportional or mixed), district magnitude, PR formula (Danish, Hare, Sainte-Lague, LR-Droop, DHont, LR-Imperiali, Imperiali highest averages), list system (Open or preferential, Closed), PR legal threshold (minimum percentage of votes required for a party to be admitted into parliament), number of districts, and number of seats available or filled.
For every election we record whether the election was scheduled beforehand or called early, the number of rounds, and the turnout for each round. Only France has two rounds, we record the second round whenever a choice need to be made. In the case of countries that use two different votes with different electoral systems, such as Germany and Mexico, we code the PR one. We record the vote share and seat share obtained by every party elected to parliament, recording which parties were "traditional" and which "non-traditional", 10 and which parties were right-leaning and which left. Finally, we record the vote share for parties not elected to parliament if categorized as non-traditional (e.g. far right, far left or green).
In general, we follow standard coding rules such as Carey-Hix (2011)'s. We use several sources, including previous publications containing such information (e.g. Carey-Hix (2011) and DPI (2015)), official records (in print and online), and unofficial online sites (e.g. Google, Wikipedia). 11 Economic indicators such as the share of employment accounted for the industrial sector, GDP, unemployment and inflation were obtained from the OECD, the ILO and the World Banks public databases. In addition to this, we collected the quantity of imports from China to each OECD country from the UN Comtrade Database. Specifically, we added the total dollar amount of imports from 60 categories of goods broadly defined as industrial in origin, those classified 30 to 90 in the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, for each year available. Most countries had data available only from 1989. All variables containing monetary amounts are measured in real terms, and with purchasing power parity when available; when used in an estimation, these variables are logged.
Data availability varies with variable. The estimations shown in the text use the maximum 9 Countries that were admitted as members by 2010. 10 Traditional parties are understood as those formed around the end of the second World War and/or that have alternated in power during most of the 20th century. Non-traditional parties are, in general, those that are not traditional which have anti-establishment platforms. For example, in Germany the SPD and CDU/CSU are traditional left and right respectively, the Left (Linke) and Green are non-traditional left, the AfD is non-traditional right, and the FDP is traditional yet neither left nor right.
11 In order to cross-check our data, a random sample is checked against official records, where available. number of years and countries for which there is data available for our main variables, namely party fragmentation and the share of employment accounted for the industrial sector, for OLS estimates this is from 1966 until 2015, for 2SLS from 1989. Since some potentially relevant controls are available only for a subset of years and/or countries, in the text we present estimates using only those controls available for the maximum sample, and in the appendix we re-do our estimates using additional controls. parliament as well as within right parties. This first finding is precisely the reason that justifies checking whether the relationship between industrial jobs and fragmentation is (i) specific to the left and (ii) systematic, rather than spurious, which is the task we undertake in the next sections.
Research Design
We will employ three research designs: an ordinary least squares model with country and year fixed effects and a two-stage least squares model using as instrument trade flows from China, in order to estimate the effect of industrial jobs on left fragmentation, and a fixed effects model using the timing of scheduled elections to study the effect of left fragmentation on policy. A description of each design and a discussion of its potential threats is presented below.
OLS with fixed effects
In the case of an ordinary least squares model, we will estimate the following equation
where i indexes countries and t indexes years when an election was held. Given the data limitations and the year of elections, we are able to consider all 35 OECD but two, South Korea and Latvia, and all years from 1966 until 2015. In every year where an election was held, the sample includes a median of 4.5 countries, with as few as 1 (e.g. 1995) and as many as 13 (in 2011).
Our dependent variable y it will measure either vote share or party fragmentation. Following the literature, our preferred measure for fragmentation is effective number of parties. Our main coefficient of interest is β, which accompanies IndJobs it−1 the share of employment that corresponds to the industrial and manufacturing sector. Since some elections are held in the middle of the year and in order to minimize reverse causality issues, we measure IndJobs it−1 the year previous to the election. All standard errors are clustered at the year level to correct for non-independence of observations across countries within a year, for example due to global political or economic trends. 13 The main threat to the identification of β as a causal estimate in this design is that the share of industrial jobs may be correlated with other factors that drive electoral support that we do not control for, both across countries and years. Common political and economic shocks are chief concerns, for example when the support for non-traditional left parties is increasing across the board due to cultural changes. Even if this wasn't a concern, country-specific time-varying phenomena may pose issues. For example, it is possible that technological advances reduce industrial jobs at the same time that they increase per capita income, the latter which may change the relative attractiveness of traditional vis-a-vis non-traditional parties. It is also possible that globalization increased pressure on making electoral systems more proportional at the same time it ships manufacturing jobs to developing countries, the former which may account for the bulk of the increase in fragmentation of parties elected to parliament.
To account for some of these forces, the specification includes country fixed effects α i and year fixed effects λ t . The country fixed effects capture any time-invariant differences across countries, such as persistent differences in ideological stigma or in corruption. Year fixed effects control for global trends that affect all countries similarly. In addition to this, the specification includes a vector of covariates X it , which include GDP per capita of the year previous to the election, to avoid reverse causality issues, and a collection of controls for the political system valid the year of the election. Political controls include indicator variables for presidential, vis--vis parliamentary,
system, for open list systems, and for electoral systems with single-member districts (SMDs). In one specification, we also include and interact industrial jobs with a variable we call Min % that calculates for each election the minimum percentage of votes within a district that a party requires to secure at least one seat. This variable intends to measure, in top of the SMD dummy, the degree of proportionality of an electoral system, and it is constructed using three pieces of information: the median district magnitude, the formula used to allocate seats to parties in a proportional system (e.g. D'Hont) and the PR legal threshold, if one exists. Due to lack of data for certain years and countries, we relegate to the appendix a specification that additionally controls for inflation, participation in the labor market, unemployment rate and long-term unemployment rate, natural controls but which highly reduce estimation the sample. Finally, in the text we include both scheduled and called elections, and in the appendix we estimate equation 1 excluding elections that were called ahead of the next scheduled election just to check for robustness.
2SLS
Correcting for the factors above, OLS allows us produce very reliable estimates of the correlation between the fall in industrial jobs and party fragmentation, but only a tentative causal claim. This is because identification still relies on selection on observables, that is, that the share of industrial jobs in each country in year t − 1 is "as good as randomly assigned", conditional on α i , λ t and X it .
This condition seems rather implausible because it is not difficult to conjecture many country and election specific phenomena −cultural factors, for example− that are very hard to measure and whose shocks affect both the electoral and economic fortunes of a country.
A research design aimed at leveraging exogenous variation to identify a causal relation in the context of a panel of the most powerful economies seems almost unrealistic. Any such design would have to argue that it possesses a source of variation that is, conditional on the set of controls, completely independent from shocks in party fragmentation in OECD parliaments. Despite the minimum chance of achieving this, we present our best shot of identifying causal variation through an instrumental variables approach.
We propose to instrument IndJobs by using imports of industrial goods from China to each individual country in our sample, here called IndImports. This instrument has to satisfy the three known conditions for a good instrument. First, IndImports needs to be correlated with IndJobs. We argue that a lagged IndImports may provide information to industrial producers which allows them to adjust their production and hiring plans, thus affecting current IndJobs.
Second, the influence of IndImports on left fragmentation must run only through its influence in IndJobs, and not directly through its own or indirectly through other channels. This assumption is not entirely implausible, specially to the extent that controversies regarding the shipment of industrial jobs to third-world countries and China's trade record usually pops up in the public discussion as it relates to its effect on jobs. However, this assumption could certainly be violated through other economic channels, for example if increased disposable income coming from cheaper imported goods changed the voter's political preferences away from traditional parties, for reasons other than the labor market. Third, conditional on α i , λ t and X it−1 , IndImports must be "as good as randomly assigned" to each country. This is the hardest assumption to justify because, for example, it is hard to imagine that shocks in party structure in parliament do not affect the government's trade decisions. Therefore, wee proceed with this instrument, yet with caution. First, we measure IndImports two period before we measure party fragmentation, which nevertheless does not entirely solve the exogeneity issue because politicians may change trade policy in anticipation of changes in the political arena, among others fragmentation. Second, we produce IV estimates using the full sample as well as excluding the two biggest world economies, U.S. and Japan, obtaining similar results. A final concern of using this measure is that trade flow information in only available since 1989, which highly reduces our sample, potentially increasing the noise of the estimation.
In order to estimate the effect of IndJobs on party fragmentation we calculate a two stage least squares. First, we estimate the first stage, equation (2) below, the effect of industrial imports on industrial jobs. Using the estimated coefficients in equation (2), we predict IndJobs and use this prediction, IndJobs, to then estimate equation (3), the second stage.
IndJobs it−1 = α i + λ t + δ IndImports it−2 + X it−1 Π + it (2)
where the coefficient β IV is the instrumental variable estimate of the causal effect of industrial jobs on party fragmentation. 14 
Fixed Effects using timing of scheduled elections
In this paper we study the effect of the fall on industrial jobs on equilibrium left fragmentation, which itself has an effect on equilibrium policy outcomes. However, party fragmentation in parliament can affect policy in many different ways, depending on the source of the fragmentation.
So, even if the fall in industrial jobs is the main cause for left fragmentation, testing the effect of fragmentation on policy will confound the effect of other potential sources of fragmentation, which may bias upwards or downwards depending on the sign of these sources. On the other hand, testing the effect of industrial jobs on policy is a naive exercise, because the fall in industrial jobs affects policy through many channels, only one of which is fragmentation. 15 No strategy is ideal. However, in order to provide a tentative test of the effect of the fall in vote cohesiveness and thus left fragmentation on policy, we undertake the first strategy described above: test the effect of quasi-exogenous changes in party fragmentation on policy choice and policy outcome. Besides the research design's assumptions described above, the main assumption of this exercise is that any alternative source of fragmentation will at most attenuate the effect of fragmentation due to the fall of industrial jobs that we expect from the model. 16 Our main estimating equation is y it+1 = α i + λ t + β 1 Lef tF rag it + β 2 Lef tF rag it × Lef tGov it + δ Lef tGov it + X it Π + it (4) where i indexes countries and t years. Similar to above, we are able to consider all 35 OECD countries but South Korea, and all years from 1966 until 2015. We include the maximum number of observations for the main estimation in order to maximize the power of the empirical strategy (we need as many years with at least one, hopefully more, election been held). However, since we only know the effect of fragmentation due to industrial jobs fall and we only find this relationship in multi-member districts (MMD), in the appendix we estimate the effects on the sub-sample of MMD systems obtaining very similar results, in part because most observations in the sample involve this system (80%).
14 In practice, we use the Stata code ivregress which automatically calculates the first and second stage, using the correct standard errors.
15 This is the same reason an instrumental variables approach will not work, because the exclusion restriction will not be satisfied. 16 That is, either the other sources of fragmentation will add noise to the estimate we are looking for, thereby increasing our estimated standard errors, or at most will produce an attenuation bias, if the effect of this other sources goes in the opposite direction. However, if the other sources have an effect on policy that goes in the same direction as the fall in industrial jobs, then our coefficient will capture these other sources and inflate our estimate.
Fragmentation changes only at elections, and elections are held in different years for different countries. This staggered nature of elections allows us to employ a differences-in-differences-like design to test how left fragmentation Lef tF rag it , as measured by the seat share in parliament, has affected policy choice and outcome. 17 Since we expect left fragmentation to have a different effect on policy depending on whether the left is party of government and when it's not, we include a term interacting Lef tF rag it with an indicator variable equal to 1 if the left was part of the government that was formed, Lef tGov it .
We test two sets of dependent variables, y it+1 , in order to measure the degree to which policy choice and outcomes have departed from those benefiting median voters the most. The first set intends to capture policy choices. First, we measure total government spending dedicated to community amenities (water supply, street lighting, parks building, community development), our best measure of public good without an ideological component (such as Defense spending, for example), which to the extent that it benefits most voters we assume it benefits the median voter. Then we consider the opposite, government spending targeted to a very specific audience, of which the best measure we have is agricultural producers' support. Finally, we wanted to use spending variables that clearly revealed an ideological component. Defense spending and environmental spending were good options for right and left, but both can also be considered public goods. We use government spending on redistribution (old age spending, housing subsidies, disability insurance), to the extent that it's a bastion from the left and it is usually considered to benefit a sector of the population at the expense of median income tax payers (high income as well if they do not take advantage of loop holes and tax incentives to re-invest). Important spending categories, such as education, health or economic affairs, are not considered since we cannot clearly classify them. 18 Second, we measure the three main short/medium-term macroeconomic policy outcomes, unemployment, inflation and GDP growth. We expect the first two to benefit the median voter the most, unemployment because it usually hits stronger the least educated and non-unionized, and inflation because it is known to hurt the most those less wealthy −having a highest fraction of their wealth in cash. On the other hand, it is unclear to us what to expect from GDP growth because an effect on productivity usually takes longer than one electoral cycle. We expect to see a higher effect on unemployment than on inflation, because the former is more under the control of the seating government, as opposed to the latter which depending on the country may be in the hands of an autonomous agency.
We make a deliberate choice to focus on short-run outcomes. Depending on the country, elections are held every 2, 3, 4 or 5 years. Thus, to focus on the effect of the recent fragmentation 17 Formally, we call a differences-in-differences design one estimating on group data, that is, where every unit that suffers change over time contains several observations, but this is simply equivalent to an OLS with fixed effects on group data, so here we treat these terms interchangeably. See Angrist and Pischke (2009) for details. 18 We use the Classification of Functions of Government (COFOG) from the OECD.
change without contaminating the results with future elections, we measure all outcomes in the year posterior to the election, which inevitably limits the scope of our analysis.
As part of the fixed-effects model, equation (4) 
Results

Industrial Jobs and Left Fragmentation, OLS
First, we examine how changes in the labor market affect vote support for each of the four factions, traditional left, non-traditional left, traditional right and non-traditional right. Estimating equation
(1) using as outcome the vote share of each faction, Table 2 shows that a decrease in industrial jobs has a statistical significant effect on growing the non-traditional left support, as predicted 19 The "parallel trends assumption" in a differences-in-differences design with group data. in the theory. In particular, a 10% decrease in the share of manufacturing jobs increases in 9% the vote share of non-traditional parties. Even though the correlation between industrial jobs and traditional party vote support is positive as expected, this correlation is not statistically significant, as it isn't with right vote share, traditional or non-traditional, either.
Notice that a statistically insignificant effect in table 2 does not necessarily mean that voters did not change their support; it just means that, in net, total support did not change, because voters could have joined and others left a faction. Replicating these estimates using the vote as share of registered voters (as opposed to turnout) closely mimics these results, and no effect is observed on turnout, as shown in the appendix.
Then, we turn to party fragmentation. Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation (1) using as outcome variable the effective number of parties elected to parliament, as well as the same measure but in the subset of right and left parties respectively. The theory above indicated that a decrease in the cohesiveness of the left vote, which we measure as the fall in industrial jobs, should fragment the left, but should have no effect on right parties fragmentation. Results in table 3 confirm this intuition. In particular, this table shows that a 10% shrink in the share of industrial jobs is associated with an increase in about 0.5-0.6 effective parties in the left, measured both by vote intention (vote share) and the resulting seat share in parliament. The fall in industrial jobs, however, is not shown to be associated with changes in right fragmentation. Consequently, a shrink in industrial jobs is negatively, but not statistically significantly, correlated with party fragmentation in parliament as a whole.
A natural follow-up question is whether this effect is exclusive to a specific type of democracy.
The theory has a simple implication when it comes to the magnitude of districts, because the traditional left always holds an edge over the non-traditional one, thus in a winner-take-all system, such as single-member districts, only the traditional left or traditional right will succeed in achieving seats. Therefore, we expect only in multi-member districts, proportional systems to observe an effect of the fall in industrial jobs. Table 4 tests this conjecture in two ways. First, in top of the baseline specification of equation (1) we interact the share of industrial jobs with an indicator variable equal to 1 if the electoral system contains only single-member districts (SMD), and 0 if some form of proportional representation is in place. Column (1) shows that the effect completely comes from non-SMD systems, because the coefficient for IndJobs is estimated to be a statistically significant 0.52 parties per 10% of IndJobs change, very close to our baseline estimation, and adding this estimate to the coefficient accompanying the interaction sums to 3.7 which is statistically indistinguishable from zero ("+ p-value" in bottom of the table: 0.445).
A SMD dummy is, however, a very coarse measure of proportionality, and thus we turn to our variable M in %, the minimum share of votes within a district theoretically necessary for a party to secure one seat. Column (2) shows the estimates when including an interaction of IndJobs with this measure, results similar to those of column (1) . At very low levels of M in %, that is, at very high levels of proportionality, the effect is of a statistically significant 0.71 parties per 10%
of IndJobs change, slightly higher than our baseline estimate. With every 10% increase in M in 
Industrial Jobs and Left Fragmentation, 2SLS
As discussed above, the estimates so far presented are accurate measures of the correlation between industrial jobs and left fragmentation, but not necessarily good measures of a causal effect. In order to attempt to get at a causal story, we estimate equations (2) and (3) in a two-stage procedure to produce instrumental variables estimates. One of the main issues we face is that the available data to run this exercise forces our sample to contain only half of the years than in the OLS exercise, greatly reducing the statistical power. Furthermore, the number of countries with available data per year varies considerably. Finally, as explained above, the exogeneity assumption needed for the instrument to be valid is threatened by the fact that many of the countries under study are influential economies whose politics may shape their relationship with China and their trade policy.
In order to consider these issues, we estimate the instrumental variable coefficient for the whole available sample, years 1989 to 2015, for the sample of back-to-back years with at least one election (in fact, two), 1996 to 2015, and for the full sample but excluding the two biggest world economies, the U.S. and Japan. The estimated coefficients are presented in table 5. In general terms, the estimates confirm our previous findings: the fall in industrial jobs fragments the left, without affecting the right or parliament as whole. The magnitude of the coefficient is higher, as expected, since the 2SLS is interpreted as a treated-on-the-treated estimate; however significant, a slightly weak first stage also contributes to the magnitude of the coefficients: a partial R 2 ranging from 0.07 to 0.12. The level of significance is around the 8-11%, which is expected in this smaller sample and much noisier estimation method. For this reason, in table 5 we include a + symbol to point out coefficients statistically significant to the 85% confidence level. These estimates are also less robust than the OLS ones, for in the appendix we show that slight specification and sample adjustments while almost not varying the estimated coefficient change the standard errors enough to make the statistical significance of this estimates volatile. 
Left Fragmentation and Policy
Proposition 2 indicates that a decrease in the left vote cohesiveness shifts the equilibrium policy enacted in parliament away from the median voter. In particular, when the left is in government (alone or in a grand coalition), the policy shifts to the left; when the left is outside, the policy shifts to the right.
In table 6 we show estimates of equation (4) for our preferred specification, and in table 9 using the full sample (risking endogeneity) and using country-specific trends. The focus of table 6 is on the coefficient of Left Frag, which indicates the effect of left fragmentation when the left is not in government, and on the sum of Left Frag and Left Frag × Left Gov, which indicates the effect of left fragmentation when the left is in government and whose statistical significance is measured by the p-value "+ p-value" at the bottom of the table. In sum, results generally confirm the direction of our hypothesis, but some of the findings are not fully robust.
Spending on our preferred measure of public good decreases with fragmentation when the left is in government, but there is no evidence that it does with left fragmentation when the right is. Agricultural producers' support, our example of an easily targetable spending, increases with fragmentation regardless of the identity of the government. Finally, spending on redistribution, bastions of the left, increases with fragmentation when the left is government and decreases when the right is. Table 9 shows that these estimates are largely robust to changes in the specification and are practically replicated when restricting the sample to MMD systems.
On the policy outcome side, left fragmentation has a strong and robust effect on unemployment:
when the left is in government, one additional left party causes an increase of 1% in the share of workers that are unemployed. Table 10 in the appendix shows that this effect is observed across unemployment of the women and youth, as well as long-term unemployment. One hypothesis for this result is that the fall in industrial jobs forces the left to continue serving organized workers −who mobilize well− with employment benefits and protection at the expense of the workers who lost their jobs and who find it hard to get a job given the high costs of employment. Finally, left fragmentation has a marginally statistically significant, and non-robust, effect on increasing inflation when the left is in government, and no effect on GDP growth, both of which fall close to our predictions. Here again results are robust to changes in the specification and in the sample to MMD systems, as shown in appendix table 9.
Discussion and Conclusion
This paper has shown that the decline in industrial jobs in rich democracies has, as predicted, increased the number of parties on the left. In concrete terms, a ten percent drop in industrial employment adds 0.6 parties on the left, on average. The parties are on average correspondingly smaller than the parties they replace, raising the question of declining electoral and legislative effectiveness. What happens to the power of the left when it breaks into pieces?
It is striking that left-party fragmentation occurs only in proportional representation systems, suggesting that plurality electoral rules continue to contain the dispersion of preferences on the left within traditional parties.
The growing electoral heft of alt right parties in Germany and Sweden, the inordinate time it takes to form governments in Belgium and the Netherlands, and the market jitters surrounding Italys new populist coalition, not to mention anti-market populism in the US and UK, all raise pressing questions about the future of democracy in a post-industrial world. Are current democratic institutions up to the task of representing public interests in a way that is consistent with long term political stability and economic prosperity? Are some institutions better than others?
Our current study does not pretend to answer all of these questions, but it does offer grounds for concern. We have found evidence that suggests that party fragmentation on the left has shifted policy focus away from the median voter, as measured by policy choices on public goods and by policy outcomes such as the unemployment rate. It bears watching to see if the same labor market shifts that have broken parties asunder also threaten the ability of party leaders to resist bottom-up accountability. Such a palliative, our findings suggests, would invite greater misery in the longer run.
That distributive outcomes move away from the median voter does not mean that they go to the most disadvantaged. Simultaneous increases in unemployment raise the possibility that they might instead be accruing to a shrinking labor aristocracy. Alternatively, they might be going to supporters of other parties in coalition governments−such as farmers. Nor have we settled the question whether fragmentation drives policy away from programmatic outcomes and toward clientelist ones. We have theoretical reasons for thinking that it does, because post-election bargaining creates incentives for parties to satisfy their supporters while externalizing the costs of their deals onto third parties. But these are questions for future empirical research.
Finally, two important pieces of the puzzle have intentionally been left out. First, the effect of party discipline how it interacts with fragmentation to generate platform and policy choices.
Second, some conjecture that left fragmentation begets right fragmentation, but our analysis isolates the latter by assuming complete right-vote cohesiveness. The rise of far-right parties in western Europe was probably the most notable political phenomenon of the last electoral cycle, and it deserves proper attention. As explained in the text, formally this would require us to depart from the assumption that the right vote is unified in order to study (a) whether in equilibrium the traditional right would prefer to moderate and (b) under which circumstance they loose the far-right vote. These are important aspects of that we are currently developing in separate work. 
B Robustness of empirical results
